Independent Directors - responsibility, remuneration and liability
Published: Nov 26, 2020
By V Ranganathan
INDEPENDENT director is a subject that is constantly in the news nowadays and hardly for the right reasons. The most recent is the resignation of a well-known former banker from the post of an Independent Director (ID) of a corporate that has been in the news for its failed attempt to delist. There are concerns raised by investors who found the stated reasons for resignation specious and vague. There have been many more such cases in recent times and the investor community seeks more specific reasons for such resignations to know if there are governance related triggers for these. This puts the spotlight yet again on the vexed issues of the role, responsibility, expectations and rewards and liabilities of IDs. The article is not delving into the origin and legal frame work of this subject as these are much and too often discussed. The attempt is to find some answers to a few vexed questions.
It is a fact that in the Indian context the concept of ID co-exists with the phenomenon of a corporate sector that is predominantly controlled and managed by promoter groups. There is a level of opposition or tension as the IDs are expected to represent the interests of the non-promoter shareholders but owe their appointment to the grace of the promoters as the largest single shareholders. This is a structural dichotomy that is practically difficult to reconcile however much it is professed that IDs are of such maturity and caliber that they can straddle this chasm. As long as the promoters are managing the company in everyone's interests the IDs can sail through comfortably; but if such is not the case, then arises the dilemma whether the ID compromises the integrity of his role and get the along or leave the role to avoid confrontations. The third alternative of the ID is remaining in her role and try and educate the promoter to change his ways is more a will-o-the-wisp. Therefore, it is necessary to accept a construct for IDs that acknowledges these imperfections and equally provide for a regime where the honest ones are not driven away by the rigours of law and punishment and the dishonest ones don't feel incentivised to game the system.
A critical point that often comes up for consideration is the form and quantum of reward or remuneration for IDs. Commonly, a very liberal remuneration structure is seen as creating a conflict in independence and equally a very measly reward is a deterrent to get high quality talent on board. Ideally, the compensation should be left to market forces and should not be indicative of any implicit compromise or collusion if it is on the liberal side. However the liability for proven failure to perform the role expected of an ID should clearly be linked to the compensation in some form and manner. While it is not to suggest that a well-paid ID is to be seen as more guilty in a situation as compared to a less paid one, the factor of compensation in some manner represents the level of involvement of a ID in matters beyond what is typically discussed in a board meeting and hence in some manner indicative of the possible awareness of failures in compliance or governance which a less involved ID may not be privy to. This cannot be reduced to a scientific formula to convince everyone but is perhaps the right starting point to attempt a fair and equitable system of reward and punishment.
When a corporate scandal or a misdemeanour surfaces, the first attention is drawn by the press and governance agencies to the names of IDs and the remuneration drawn by them. Thus linking the penalty for established failure of IDs after due investigation to the remuneration drawn over the tenure does better justice than slapping criminal cases and harass the person by seeking her presence at a magistrate court or a police station. The monetary penalty or disgorgement is a better way to provide comfort to IDs that unless some criminal intent is established by any investigating agency, a ID will have the liberty to walk away from any corporate scandal by paying a proportion of the remuneration drawn. In some sense, it is like a composition scheme and relieves the person of any further disability under the law. The time has come for the government and agencies keen to improve corporate governance to devise a punishment system that is not seen as vindictive but yet comforts the constituencies that suffer the consequences of corporate failures that they are not the only victims in this system.
[The author is Former Director, Tax, E&Y Chennai and the views expressed are strictly personal.]